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Abstract  
Acts of scientific calculation have long been considered central to the formation of the 
modern nation-state, yet the transnational spaces of knowledge generation and political 
action associated with climate change seem to challenge territorial modes of political order. 
This paper explores the changing geographies of climate prediction through a study of the 
ways in which climate change is rendered knowable at the national scale in India. The recent 
controversy surrounding an erroneous prediction of melting Himalayan glaciers by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides a window onto the complex 
and at times antagonistic relationship between the Panel and Indian political and scientific 
communities. The Indian reaction to the error, made public in 2009, drew upon a national 
history of contestation around climate change science, and corresponded with the 
establishment of a scientific assessment network (INCCA) which has given the state a new 
platform on which to bring together knowledge about the future climate. I argue that INCCA 
is indicative of the growing use of regional climate models within longer traditions of 
national territorial knowledge-making, allowing a re-scaling of climate change according to 
local norms and practices of linking scientific knowledge to political action. I illustrate the 
complex co-production of the epistemic and the normative in climate politics, but also seek 
to show how co-productionist understandings of science and politics can function as 
strategic resources in the ongoing negotiation of social order. In this case, scientific 
rationalities and modes of environmental governance contribute to the contested epistemic 
construction of territory and the evolving spatiality of the modern nation-state under a 
changing climate.  
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In late 2009, it emerged that a statement that had been made in the Working Group II 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 4th Assessment Report was 
incorrect. The report stated that ‘glaciers in the Himalayas are receding faster than in any 
other part of the world and, if the present rate continues, the likelihood of them 
disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is very high’ (IPCC, 2007: 493). This 
(probabilistically hedged) prediction was found to have been made on unreasonable 
grounds. Indeed, it emerged that the year 2035 had originated in a glaciologist’s statement 
in a magazine interview in the late 1990s, and had found its way into the IPCC report via a 
number of non-peer reviewed publications (or ‘grey literature’; for a detailed account see 
Banerjee and Collins, 2010). 
While the 2035 claim had not been headline news on the publication of AR4, perhaps 
because it was not included in Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers nor in the 
synthesis summary, the figure caused some unease in both political and glaciological 
communities in India and elsewhere. The importance of glacial meltwaters for agriculture, 
industry and human livelihoods across northern India positions the Himalayan region as a 
key site of scientific and political concern (e.g. Moors et al., 2011). The journalist involved 
with breaking the IPCC story in the news section of Science was born on the banks of the 
Ganges, perhaps India’s most famous glacier-fed river.1 He stated in an interview with me 
that: 
there is a deep connection in my personal life for the Ganges and for Gangotri glacier. 
And when this [IPCC] report came out I was aghast. I was taken aback, thinking ‘how 
can this happen?’ And then I started hearing murmurs from Indian glaciologists 
saying ‘the IPCC has got it wrong’. But remember, IPCC is 2,500 of the top-notch 
scientists so they are looked upon as a very august body. So nobody was going to 
come on record. Glaciologists... they work very slowly. Glaciers move slowly, 
glaciologists also move slowly. It took them time before that murmur became a little 
louder. And then we started looking at it carefully. In 2009 I started looking at it very 
vigorously. Then the murmur became a little louder. (interview, 6 March 2012, New 
Delhi) 
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The ‘murmurs’ were also picked up by Jairam Ramesh, then Minister of Environment and 
Forests. Apparently sensing not only some perplexity about the 2035 claim, but also a 
measure of disagreement within the glaciological community about the true status and 
prospects of the Himalayan glaciers, Ramesh commissioned a review of existing knowledge 
produced by Indian scientists. A prominent glaciologist was persuaded out of retirement to 
conduct the review, which concluded that there is a mixed picture of receding and 
advancing glaciers in the Himalayan range, and that no trend can be attributed to 
anthropogenic climate change (Raina, 2009). This conclusion was reported in Science in the 
context of refuting the IPCC claim about Himalayan glaciers melting by 2035 (Bagla, 2009). 
The same journalist who narrated the story of these counterposed scientific assessments in 
Science also filed a report for New Delhi Television, a major English-language television 
channel in India. In response to the news segment, the chair of the IPCC, Indian scientist 
Rajendra Pachauri, famously dismissed the Indian government report as ‘voodoo science’, 
questioning the evidential basis and scientific rigour of the report.2 The term ‘voodoo 
science’ functioned as an instance of boundary work, an effort to delineate what is to count 
as legitimate scientific knowledge, and what is to count as mere belief, superstition, or 
ideology (Gieryn, 1983).3 This controversy sparked important reframings of the relationships 
between the IPCC, the Indian government, and national and international modes of political 
knowledge-making and action. The so-called Himalayagate or Glaciergate incident4 re-
animated a history of scientific and political contestation that has shaped the relationship 
between climate politics and national space in India. This relationship informed the 
emergence of a new national assessment body, the Indian Network for Climate Change 
Assessment (INCCA), under the direction of Jairam Ramesh. As scholars of science and 
technologies studies (STS) have shown, moments of controversy can bring the contested 
practices, norms and politics of knowledge-making into the open, as various actors seek to 
translate emergence and flux into stability and order (e.g. Jasanoff, 2004a; Whatmore, 2009). 
Himalayagate and INCCA thus offer an opportunity to study the relations between 
international and national modes of knowledge production, and the potential of 
international science, such as that represented and mobilised by the IPCC, to travel and be 
translated into diverse national contexts and political cultures (Hulme, 2010a; Jasanoff, 
2010; Lahsen, 2007; Livingstone, 2003). These political cultures bear upon the evolution of 
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the forms of knowledge from which national governments draw certain understandings of 
and commitments to the climate change issue. In India, INCCA is a site at which scientific 
prediction and the governance of a national space have been brought into conversation 
with each other. I analyse this development in relation to a broader history of national 
environmental knowledge-making that points towards a distinctive ‘civic epistemology’ 
(Jasanoff, 2005a). I suggest that regional climate prediction constitutes a new form 
governmental gaze, with both its own effects and its own potential blind-spots. Therefore, 
this predictive knowledge arguably represents an important juncture in the history and use 
of the notion of ‘territory’. 
Knowing and producing territory 
Climate change, understood as an epistemic and political object defined by globality and the 
pursuit of a transnationally enlightened polity (Jasanoff, 2010; Hulme, 2010b), generates 
frictions with conventional modes of ordering the relationship between science and politics 
in the system of territorially-bounded nation-states.  In the history of the modern nation-
state, territory has been both a central object and means of governing. In conventional 
discourses of international relations, both academic and public, territory is often conceived 
as the bounded space over which nation-states exercise a unique sovereignty (e.g. Weber, 
1946). However, a strand of work in political geography and related disciplines has sought to 
dig deeper into this notion of territory. The effort here is to not take national territories for 
granted as spatial units (a move characterized by John Agnew (1994) as the ‘territorial trap’), 
but rather to problematize and historicize territory as both political object and political 
technology. That is, ‘territory’ is understood to refer to both a thing to be known and 
controlled, and to a means of achieving certain goals which precede territory-as-object 
(Braun, 2000; Elden, 2007; 2010). Territory can therefore be seen as being constructed, 
perhaps most visibly through calculative and representational techniques such as 
cartography (Crampton 2010; Edney, 1997; Winichakul, 1994;). The well-worn adage of the 
critical cartographer – ‘the map precedes the territory’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 2) – captures the 
notion that the will to map space, often with the aim of, for example, better organizing the 
network of property rights, is central to the emergence of the territorially bounded nation-
state (Elden, 2010; Pickles, 2004; Wood, 1992). In this paper, I seek to explore the co-
evolution of practices of territorial calculation with the shifting norms and discourses of 
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Indian climate politics. Thinking territory and politics together in this way may be aided by 
turning to the notion of co-production. 
The notion of co-production, broadly defined, holds that ‘the ways in which we seek to 
know and represent the world … are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live 
in it’ (Jasanoff, 2004b: 2; see also Ezrahi, 1990; Jasanoff, 2011; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). In 
this understanding, knowledge and forms of political order mutually construct one another. 
Epistemic commitments to what ‘is’ are inseparable from normative commitments to what 
‘ought to be’ (e.g. Hulme, 2009). The co-productionist approach can help make sense of how 
the cognitive, institutional, material and normative elements of a society are interlinked 
(Jasanoff, 2004a), thus offering explanatory resources for observable changes in the 
configurations of science and politics (cf. Lövbrand, 2011; Miller, 2004). As I demonstrate 
below,  an understanding of science and politics as being tightly coupled has had particular 
traction in recent Indian environmental politics. The events I describe highlight how the 
boundaries can become blurred between co-production as an analytic lens and as a 
strategic instrument wielded by powerful and knowledgeable actors (Jasanoff, 2004c: 281).   
The state is a key site of co-productionist inquiry, and such an approach offers a number of 
synergies with theories which emphasise the roles of representation and spatial 
standardization in the development and functioning of the state (Anderson, 1983; Goswami, 
2004; Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 1998). In such terms, the nation-state can be conceived as ‘a 
network that is partly held together by circulating technologies of representation and 
communication’ (Jasanoff, 2004a: 26; Sharma and Gupta, 2006). For example, in his history 
of forestry in colonial eastern India, Sivaramakrishnan (1999) argues that the project of 
state-making was intimately bound with the politics of knowledge and expertise. Although 
the history of colonial forestry can be read as the straightforward imposition of a ‘Western’ 
science on the complex social ecologies of Indian woodlands, Sivaramakrishnan argues that 
the spatial rationalities of scientific forestry were, in fact, confounded both by local 
ecological realities and by political resistances to the colonial state (see also Gadgil and 
Guha, 1993). The idiom of co-production, when brought to bear on Sivaramakrishnan’s 
analysis, highlights the emergent quality of political rule. Colonial power is not simply 
applied unilaterally, but rather made to conform to the local particularities with which it is 
confronted. Turning from the national to the international, contemporary climate change 
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offers new cosmopolitan networks of knowledge production in the form of transnational 
spaces like the IPCC (Beck et al., 2013; Hulme, 2010a) and globally circulating tools of 
climate prediction (Mahony and Hulme, 2012). Seen from a certain normative standpoint, 
the international coordination of climate science-for-policy can be interpreted as a 
‘cosmopolitan moment’ (Beck, 2009: 47) that challenges national forms of epistemic and 
political sovereignty by presenting global risks, knowledges and political power (Beck, 2009; 
Whitehead, Jones and Jones 2007). However, it would be wrong to suggest that global 
climate science and politics erase local specificities. Indeed, work in STS has highlighted the 
translation or localization of knowledges that claim universal reach (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005a; 
Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; Wilson Rowe, 2012).  
Evident in the above is that political orders are never entirely stable, nor are they ever 
simply ‘given’. Rather, they emerge out of the interplay between material and discursive 
resources in ways that are not necessarily predictable but are nonetheless amenable to 
empirical analysis. In what follows I aim to make such an empirical exploration of the 
tensions between transnational networks of knowledge production, the localization of 
global climate science, and the ongoing co-production of territory and climate politics.  
Despite clear synergies, co-productionist accounts of social ordering have not yet been 
brought into conversation with emerging geographical understandings of the nature and 
enduring political import of territory. Indeed, with a few exceptions (e.g. Miller, 2004; 
Jasanoff 2004d), the co-productionist strand of STS has yet to fully embrace questions of 
space and spatial organisation. In taking a symmetrical approach to the evolution of 
epistemic and political forms, the lens of co-production offers a powerful way of 
comprehending territory not as a historical a priori, but as a contingent product of particular 
forms of cognitive and normative development, a compound of economic, legal, strategic 
and technical forces whose changing interrelations lend territory its historic and cultural 
specificities (Elden, 2010). By studying a moment of both controversy and emergence at the 
science-policy interface in India, I aim to illustrate the local co-production of climate science 
and politics and to unpack the continuing significance of national territory in the face of 
cosmopolitan challenges to the territorial logics of the modern nation-state.  
Sources and methodology 
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This article is based predominantly on fieldwork conducted in New Delhi in February and 
March of 2012. I carried out 27 interviews with scientists participating in both IPCC and 
INCCA, and with journalists, politicians and non-governmental organisation (NGO) actors. 
Previous characterisations of Indian environmental politics describe a space of multiple 
voices and competing epistemic and normative commitments (e.g. Dubash, 2011; Jasanoff, 
2007). As illustrated below, the evolution of the Indian government’s position on climate 
change has not occurred in an institutional vacuum (see also Atteridge et al., 2012). Rather, 
a diverse array of actors has participated in the process of defining and deliberating the 
knowledge to which governmental actors have deferred in climate change debates. 
Responding to this diversity through a sampling strategy which traversed networks of 
scientific, political, NGO and media actors was therefore a response to the particular 
characteristics of Indian environmental knowledge-making, but also an attempt to 
operationalize the co-productionist stance on the relation between the epistemic and the 
normative. If scientific and political concerns cannot be neatly distinguished from one 
another, it follows that the scientific and political work of responding to climate change 
happens in a number of different settings. By identifying prominent actors through 
documentary analysis, lists of IPCC participants and notes on recent national climate change 
conferences, for example, I gained a measure of heterogeneity within my field of analytic 
vision. 
Documents were collected through Internet searches and from the library of the New Delhi-
based environmental NGO the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE). A survey of the 
major English-language daily newspapers was also conducted through the LexisNexis online 
database of news reports. The search terms ‘climate’, ‘global warming’, ‘IPCC’, ‘Himalaya’, 
‘glaciers’ and ‘INCCA’ were used to identify relevant news articles. Along with the other 
documents and interview transcripts, these were subject to interpretive content analysis 
which drew on the tools of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). This involved close thematic 
coding of the texts and the building-up of conceptual categories (such as ‘credibility’) 
through iteration between the data and the conceptual interests introduced above.  
In the next section I situate the IPCC glacier controversy within a longer history of national 
environmental politics and epistemic contestation. I then explore how this incident and this 
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history informed the emergence of INCCA, before offering conclusions about the co-
production of new territorial knowledges and new forms of climate politics. 
A lineage of contestation 
The controversy over melting Himalayan glaciers points towards a longer history of 
occasional antagonism between epistemic claims made in the global North and claims made 
in India. In what may have been the first popular presentation in India of the climate change 
issue, a contestation over the science and its implications took centre-stage. In 1982 the 
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) produced its first ‘Citizens’ Report’ on the ‘State 
of India’s Environment’, the first of a series of reports that sought to present the Indian 
environment as a national object through the lens of political economy and an overriding 
concern for environmental and social justice.  In introducing the topic of climate change, the 
report took issue with a statement by British scientist John Gribben in New Scientist 
magazine that: 
although the third world countries will produce the greenhouse problem by the early 
21st century… they will suffer little adverse consequences themselves, and may even 
benefit as a result. Meanwhile, their traditional enemies in the rich North will suffer 
the worst consequences of the developing world’s carbon pollution. (quoted in 
Agarwal, Sharma and Chopra, 1982: 87) 
This position was challenged by the marshalling of a range of evidence, including emerging 
modelling studies which suggested that the tropics and sub-tropics would see perturbed 
rainfall patterns that would put the region’s agriculture at risk. The CSE authors also took 
issue with Gribben’s characterisation of the shifting responsibility for climate change. The 
authors foregrounded arguments about the historic responsibility of the North and the need 
to allow developing countries to continue on the path of industrialization: 
Rich countries should not be allowed to argue in the future that the fuel 
consumption of developing countries ought to be kept in check to control the 
increase in carbon dioxide, regardless of their own contribution in the past. (Agarwal, 
Sharma and Chopra, 1982: 90) 
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This was the first manifestation of an argument that would come to define not just CSE’s 
position on climate change, but also the Indian government’s. In a highly influential volume 
in 1991, CSE directors Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain famously argued against a World 
Resources Institute (WRI) report by stating that emissions should be counted on a per capita 
basis in order to work the differential historic responsibility for climate change into global 
calculations of how the mitigation burden should be shared (Agarwal and Narain, 1991). 
They also argued for a distinction to be made between ‘luxury’ and ‘survival’ emissions, 
suggesting that a molecule of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere does not have a universal 
status. That is, carbon dioxide produced in a wood-burning stove in rural India has a 
profoundly different ethical (and therefore, the authors suggest, legal) status from that 
expelled from the tailpipe of an oversized vehicle in the United States.   
This notion of common but differentiated responsibility based on per capita emissions 
became a cornerstone of India’s negotiating position in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the rationale behind the refusal to accept binding emissions 
cuts (Atteridge et al., 2012; Stevenson 2011). However, I want to draw attention to the 
episode’s entangling of the epistemic and the normative, the intimate relation between 
assertions of what is and conceptions of what ought to be. This is a widely-reported 
characteristic of much environmental knowledge making in India (e.g. Jasanoff, 2004d, 
2005b, 2007; Lele, 2011), with bodies like CSE foregrounding their arguments for social and 
environmental justice in any analytic descriptions of the state of the environment. 
Contestations such as these continued, for example in the deeply normative struggle over 
the economic valuation of an individual human life in the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report 
(Masood, 1995), and in the contestation between US and Indian scientists over how much 
methane was estimated to be emitted from India’s rice fields (Parashar et al., 1996). 
The Indian government and the IPCC 
Incidents such as the aforementioned moments of contestation have led some observers to 
claim that the attention of the relevant arms of the Indian government has been focused on 
the UNFCCC negotiations and the preservation of the norm of differentiated responsibility, 
rather than on the process of producing IPCC assessments. For example, in 2001 Frank 
Biermann reported a lack of government interest in fostering greater participation of Indian 
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experts in the IPCC process, both in terms of helping scientists to take part as authors (e.g. 
by publicising the recruitment process or offering financial support for travel to 
international meetings5), and in terms of ensuring wide participation of Indian experts in the 
review process (Biermann, 2001; see also Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999). 
A persistent sense of the government’s relative lack of concern for the IPCC process was also 
offered by my interview respondents. In relation to the Indian government’s modest effort 
at garnering review comments and public scrutiny of IPCC documents, an Indian 
environmental economist working on the current IPCC report surmised: 
The fact that not much of this is done to me reveals that probably the government 
doesn’t feel that there’s much point in doing it, you see? I mean it could be lack of 
capacity but it could simply be a lack of interest or, as they say, you put your money 
where your mouth is. So this is [revealing a] preference. (interview, 17 February 2012, 
New Delhi) 
An ocean modeller I interviewed at one of New Delhi’s elite universities revealed a similar 
perception based on his experiences of trying to foster national-level activities to support 
Indian input into IPCC. He said that in response to a research proposal he submitted to an 
Indian science funding body, a reviewer wrote, 
‘So what if your science project, you want it to feed into the IPCC process, nobody 
reads the IPCC reports’. It was an Indian reviewer… my suspicion is fairly senior. For 
you to hear that, it sort of confounded a lot of things… I mean sure enough it’s too 
thick for any one person to sit and read it all. But to say what they said indicates that 
it’s not taken like it’s important for this country. And you know, all of us had our 
suspicions on foreign… [laughs] and thanks to you guys [referring to my British 
nationality and the legacy of British colonialism in India] well, … be that as it may, it 
may or may not be real but at least it plays well. (interview, March 6 2012, New Delhi) 
This account begs comparison with Mikaela Sundberg’s (2006) analysis of climate science 
research proposals in Sweden, where she found that linking proposed research to the 
assessment practices of the IPCC, however tangential the link might be, was seen as an 
essential strategy for attracting government attention and hence funding. It is apparent that 
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this strategy is not as effective in India. Indeed, there is reason to think that linking work to 
particular national concerns such as the monsoon might be a more effective strategy for 
attracting funding. 
My interview subjects indicated that many Indian actors regard the IPCC as being of little 
relevance to Indian concerns. Indeed, in more broad terms, the IPCC tended to perceived as 
a Western institution that challenges the epistemic sovereignty of countries like India that 
take a distinctive normative stance on climate change (cf. Lahsen, 2007). This framing is 
evident in the mainstream English-language media’s coverage of the Himalayan glacier 
controversy in India, in statements such as: 
‘For the first time, the Indian government has challenged western research that says 
global warming has hastened the melting of Himalayan glaciers’ (Hindustan Times, 
November 10 2009) 
and: 
‘The western countries, [Environmental Minister Jairam Ramesh] felt, used the IPCC 
report to pressurise India to come on board to accept mitigation targets, which was 
successfully rejected’ (Hindustan Times, March 16 2010) 
The language of challenging and rejecting scientific claims emanating from outside India 
situates this particular moment of controversy in the longer lineage of epistemic 
contestation discussed above. The sense that the IPCC and climate science as a whole is a 
space where the epistemic and the normative are deeply intertwined – with the IPCC for 
example acting as a didactic tool to put pressure on the Indian government – is a theme 
voiced by a variety of different actors. 
Defining the space of science and politics 
For over a decade, calls have come from various NGOs in India for the government to pay 
greater attention to the IPCC process. Such arguments have been advanced by CSE and 
parts of the People’s Science Movement such as the Delhi Science Forum (DSF). The 
People’s Science Movement is a collective term for a number of civil society organizations 
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that emerged after India’s independence, with aims ranging from the popularization to the 
democratization of science and related policymaking (Varma, 2001; Visvanathan, 2005). 
The DSF largely resides in this latter category. For its founder, writing in 2011, the Indian 
government’s lack of engagement with the science of climate change has hindered its ability 
to gain geopolitical advantage and assert its own sovereignty in international climate 
debates.  
Certainly as far as India goes, poor understanding of the science combined with poor 
geopolitical understanding and tactics, has meant ceding the upper hand to the USA 
and its allies to the detriment of global climate control. (Raghunandan, 2011: 170) 
This argument echoes one put forward by CSE in 1999. Writing in a volume on ‘Green 
Politics’, the Centre’s directors argued that: 
Developing countries will continue to allow industrialized countries to lead them 
astray unless they learn the importance of science in global climate negotiations… 
Western scientific institutions have a monopoly over climate science, a fact that has 
often worked against developing countries in climate negotiations. (Agarwal, Narain 
and Sharma, 1999: 31) 
While both the DSF and the CSE have been critical of Western scientific framings of climate 
change, that hasn’t prevented them from presenting science in general as a potent analytic 
tool in developing climate policy. Both organizations draw on the perception that the 
science and politics of climate change are deeply intertwined, and that to succeed in the 
politics, one must be proficient in the science. 
The emergence of INCCA 
The responses to the IPCC glacier error drew upon a history of contested knowledge claims 
and of articulations of epistemic and political sovereignty. These themes also animated an 
institutional innovation regarded by some as the emergence of an ‘Indian IPCC’ (see below) 
which could offer independence from the under-fire science of the international body. On 
October 14, 2009 a national workshop was hosted by the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) to lay out plans for a comprehensive programme of climate change 
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assessment. This led to the constitution of the Indian Network for Climate Change 
Assessment (INCCA), a nationwide network of scientists and institutions engaged with 
climate change research. Most of the scientists who have thus far contributed to reports are 
linked with government research institutions, while those residing in the more autonomous 
university sector have had less involvement. This is important to note, because government 
scientists are more disposed to participating in scientific projects that reflect and respond to 
national interests than  university scientists,  who are more likely to engage in international 
collaborative projects which transcend national borders.  .  
In May 2010, an INCCA-branded greenhouse gas emissions inventory was published (INCCA, 
2010a). This was followed in November of the same year by what was known as the ‘4x4 
Assessment’ (INCCA, 2010b), a study of the impacts of projected climate changes on four 
sectors (water resources, agriculture, forests and human health) in four regions of India (the 
Himalayan region, the North-East, the Western Ghats and the coastal region). Impacts were 
assessed based on national climate projections produced for the 2030s by a regional climate 
model run at the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology in Pune. 
The IPCC glacier incident happened between the official establishment of INCCA and the 
start of the work for the 4x4 assessment. It is therefore important to consider the impact 
that these events had on the framing and indeed the rationale for this assessment. A 2009 
Ministry of Environment and Forests document outlines the steps being taken to conduct 
national climate change assessments. It states: 
The [IPCC] AR4 projects wide ranging implications and adverse impacts on 
developing countries for reasons of their lack of capacity to respond to rapid change. 
Alarmed by the findings, the government[s] of the countries across the world are 
engaged in working out the impacts and associated vulnerabilities of their 
economies to impending projected climate change. (MoEF, 2009: 7) 
In the foreword to the 4x4 assessment by Ramesh, released around one year after the 
‘Himalayagate’ affair, a subtle shift in discourse is evident: 
we need to make the ‘3 M’s’ – Measure, Model and Monitor – the foundation of our 
decision-making and we need to build indigenous capacity for this. We should not be 
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dependent on external studies to tell us for example about the impact of climate 
change on our glaciers, on our monsoons, and indeed even on sea level rise. Indeed, 
recent evidence suggests the ‘scientific consensus’ on many of these is debatable. 
(INCCA, 2010b: 9) 
The shift is from a picture of developing countries responding uniformly to the threatened 
impacts by bringing together knowledge about national vulnerabilities, to a language of 
autonomy and of the need to be in some sense self-sufficient when it comes to evaluating 
the available evidence on climate change impacts. 
The language of ‘our glaciers’ and ‘our monsoons’ is significant in that here is a minister of 
state using terms of collective national experience and territoriality to describe masses of 
frozen water and features of atmospheric circulation (cf. O’Reilly 2011). Rhetorical 
constructions of the national are of course common to any political project (Anderson, 
1983), and  the wider cultural, political and environmental significance of these particular 
objects within (and beyond) India cannot be overstated. This mingling of the national and 
the nonhuman thus serves to introduce borders and territory into the supposedly 
borderless worlds both of science in general (Shapin, 1998) and more particularly of the 
study of an object constructed as quintessentially global, the climate (Miller, 2004; Hulme, 
2010a). 
Jairam Ramesh has offered such sentiments on numerous occasions, and often echoes the 
arguments put forward by the NGOs outlined above, that the science and politics of climate 
change are inextricably interwoven, and that to cede scientific sovereignty is to cede 
political sovereignty. For example, a report in an Indian daily newspaper cites the Minister 
as saying:  
Declaring that ‘science is politics in climate change; climate science is politics’, Union 
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh has urged Indian scientists to undertake more 
and more studies and publish them vigorously to prevent India and other developing 
countries from being ‘led by our noses by Western (climate) scientists who have less 
of a scientific agenda and more of a political agenda. (Indian Express, June 9, 2011) 
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Particularly striking here are the echoes of CSE’s description of developing countries being 
‘led astray’ by the science-laden developed countries. This open mixing of the scientific and 
the political, or the epistemic and the normative, is something that Sheila Jasanoff (2005b) 
has noted as being a characteristic of dominant modes of public knowledge making in India, 
or what she calls civic epistemology:. political and cultural norms by which knowledge claims 
within a particular political context come to be counted as authoritative and reliable bases 
for collective action. 
This empirically-observed coupling of the epistemic and the normative parallels the STS and 
social constructivist insistence on the interdependence of ‘fact’ and ‘value’. While STS 
scholars have suggested that the concealment of such entangling is characteristic of many 
Western political cultures or civic epistemologies (e.g. Ezrahi, 1990; Jasanoff, 2005a; Porter, 
1995), the recent history of environmental politics in India may offer illustration of the 
bridging of ‘the gap between co-production as an analytic approach and co-production as a 
strategic instrument in the hands of knowledgeable social actors’ (Jasanoff, 2004c: 281). For 
example, Jasanoff has observed a tight coupling of the epistemic and the normative in the 
aftermath of the Bhopal tragedy, where an industrial gas leak in 1984 caused the deaths of 
an estimated 16,000 people. In this case, epistemic closure about the causes and 
consequences of the disaster could not be attained prior to normative closure about the 
patterns of responsibility and blame, and science was just one voice among many in the 
process of achieving closure (Jasanoff, 1988, 2007). A similar patterning of the epistemic and 
the normative is evident in the approach of bodies like CSE to environmental knowledge-
making, particularly in the emphasis on responsibility in climate change debates, and also in 
Ramesh’s response both to the IPCC glacier incident and to what he saw as being shortfalls 
in the Indian government’s ability to both know and manage climate change. In what 
follows, I will give further illustration of how co-productionist understandings of order and 
change can function as strategic resources within the co-production of knowledge and social 
order. 
Jairam Ramesh and the re-ordering of climate science and politics 
Although a number of NGO actors have been sceptical about Ramesh’s approach to the 
international climate negotiations, the majority of my respondents viewed Ramesh quite 
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favourably, particularly his grasp of scientific issues. He was widely perceived as being 
competent in dealing with conflicting scientific opinions on matters such as the state of the 
Himalayan glaciers, and an individual who worked closely with MoEF for a decade described 
him as having ‘the mind of a scientist’ (telephone interview, May 17 2012). In a similar vein, 
a prominent NGO actor stated in an interview that he felt that whereas scientists or other 
specialists may be consulted on policy issues, ‘ultimately it is a clutch of politicians and 
bureaucrats who take policy decisions according to their own preferences and compulsions, 
particularly since they themselves do not have a sound understanding of the subject or 
where the specialists are coming from’ (personal communication, January 2013). In contrast 
he characterised Ramesh as ‘a highly educated engineer and management science guy, so 
he was confident in dealing with the scientific community’ (interview, March 14 2012, New 
Delhi; see also Agarwal, 2001).  
Ramesh’s reputation for changing the epistemic foundations of climate governance in India 
has in part been enhanced by INCCA, which was largely his own innovation. However, much 
of the network of scientists and data that constituted INCCA was in existence prior to 2009, 
in the form of the network that put together India’s first national communication document 
under the UNFCCC; this document included climate projections and some impact analysis 
for the last few decades of the 21st century. Although INCCA was to some degree a re-
packaging of already existing knowledge and capacity, for another NGO representative it 
represented a ‘substantive and productive effort’ to draw attention to the climate issue. In 
this sense INCCA in part reflected other examples of Jairam Ramesh instigating political 
initiatives on particular issues which did not necessarily ‘represent a deliberate departure 
from past policy positions’, but which ‘drew attention to issues through creating new fora 
and discussion’ (interview, February 10 2012, New Delhi; personal communication, January 
2013). 
If INCCA represents a partial continuation of existing developments in climate science in 
India, then the framing and promotion of the 4x4 assessment can offer insights into the 
changing configurations of climate science and policy in the country. Building off MoEF press 
releases, early media coverage was particularly interested in the idea that INCCA 
represented something of an ‘Indian IPCC’ and an indication of India’s increasing autonomy 
Accepted for publication in Social Studies of Science 44(1): 109-133 (2014) 
 
17 
 
in scientific matters pertaining to climate change (see e.g. Indian Express, October 14, 2009). 
As discussed above, this was a framing evident in the minister’s foreword to the report.  
Politics of time and space 
It is also instructive to explore the framing of the scientific study itself, particularly its spatial 
and temporal coordinates. Climate change as a global risk issue poses distinct challenges to 
the territorial logic of the modern nation state. Posed as a question of global impacts and 
international responsibility, climate change knowledges have been most prominently 
pursued through transnational spaces like the IPCC. However, it is important not to lose 
sight of the processes through which climate change has been rendered a governable entity 
at the national scale through the pursuit of knowledges that accord with and extend the 
historical project of knowing and governing a national territory (cf. Oels, 2005; Whitehead, 
Jones and Jones, 2007: 203-6). The temporal and spatial coordinates of the INCCA 
assessment offer insights into how territory and climate change are being brought (and 
thought) together in a governmental setting. 
The INCCA 4x4 Assessment presents projections for the 2030s, an unusual strategy in 
regional climate prediction, where answers are usually sought for 2050 onwards (Hulme and 
Dessai, 2008). The desire for projections for the 2030s came from Ramesh himself, and not 
from the scientists running the regional climate model6. It could be surmised that 
projections for the 2030s were an attempt to reclaim that decade of India’s future from the 
erroneous clutches of the 2035 melting glaciers claim. However, it seems that by locating 
climate change impacts on a timescale of more human proportions, Ramesh was attempting 
to inculcate a sense of political urgency amongst his fellow political actors. He offered an 
additional motivation in a speech he gave in New Delhi in November 2010: 
The important thing of this assessment is that it is for the year 2030. It’s very 
important. I want to stress this, because all assessments of climate change are for 
the year 2060 or 2070, when none of us will be around. So that’s why we are safe 
when we make all these projections. I told these guys ‘you have to make studies and 
assessments for periods in which you will be alive to be held accountable’ 
[murmuring and laughter in the audience]. (Ramesh, 2010) 
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This language of accountability and of not being ‘safe’ in the temporal distance of one’s 
epistemic claims accords with the co-production of the epistemic and the normative that is 
clearly evident elsewhere in the episode. Despite the scientists’ residing in a government 
research institution, trust in their predictions is not automatic or given, and the implication 
is that the scientists would not only be accountable for the accuracy of their predictions, but 
also in part for the political actions that are taken on the basis of the predictions. Questions 
of knowledge and of political action thus converge at the temporal horizon of the year 2030 
(cf. Beck et al., 2013: 10). 
The spatial coverage of the impacts assessment also reveals certain logics of relating 
predictive knowledge to political action. The initial climate projections used in the INCCA 
assessment were generated for an area covering the nation as a whole. However, the 
impacts analysis, for human health and agriculture for example, is conducted for four 
regions (see Figure 1). This zooming-in was in the first instance an effort to save time, as it is 
clear that Ramesh wanted a report published quickly. However, the selection of these four 
regions reveals an interesting territorial logic. The regions don’t correspond to conventional 
climatic or agricultural zones, but rather represent regions of particular natural resource 
wealth and vulnerability, for example the forests of the North-East and the water resources 
of the Himalayan region. The tacit metrics of vulnerability by which the regions were 
selected don’t speak of fragile human livelihoods, but rather of national economic and 
broad-scale ecological security. 
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Figure 1. Projected changes in precipitation in the four regions. Source: INCCA, 2010b 
The projections used in the INCCA assessment were generated by scientists at the Indian 
Institute of Tropical Meteorology in Pune, which reports to the Ministry of Earth Sciences. 
The scientists there use a regional climate model called PRECIS that was developed by the 
UK’s Met Office Hadley Centre with the expressed aim of enabling developing countries to 
produce regional climate scenarios to support adaptation policy making.  
PRECIS, which includes a regional climate model and software that enables it to run on any 
personal computer, is now at work in over 100 countries, and has formed the basis of many 
national communications under the UNFCCC and other analytic exercises. As a transnational 
community of actors united by shared epistemic commitments, the PRECIS network 
illustrates the geographic complexity of climate change knowledge production. Although 
used here alongside assertions of national scientific autonomy, the model’s global spread 
depends on its association with the prestigious Hadley Centre and on its links with the 
largely European and North American infrastructures of global climate simulation.7 The 
dynamics of this now global network of regional modellers are explored by Mahony and 
Hulme (2012). 
In the case of Indian knowledge-making, this itinerant climate model has become enmeshed 
in a new network of epistemic accountability and in articulations of national scientific 
autonomy. It thus functions as a powerful ‘boundary object’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989) 
between the worlds of science and politics, much like the global models from which it is 
descended (Shackley and Wynne, 1996).  Miller (2004) argues that the global gaze offered 
by climate science and global atmospheric models developed in tandem with the 
increasingly globalist imagination of a political solution to the knowing and managing of 
climate change. The exchange of globalist visions of scientific and political order can explain 
how climate models came to occupy such a prominent position at the science-policy 
interface, as described by Shackley and Wynne (1996), Demeritt (2001), Oels (2005) and 
others. In this case, however, the gaze is no longer just global; it is regional or, more 
precisely, national. A regional model is positioned over the Indian subcontinent and is used 
to generate national cartographies of environmental change. The question therefore 
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becomes: how is this emergent and increasingly popular means of viewing climate change 
being co-produced with evolving forms of political order? 
Governmental knowledges and national space 
The task of addressing this question can be started by considering the broader epistemic 
landscape within which this predictive knowledge sits. Ramesh, whenever he has spoken of 
the need for India to act on climate change, has made the claim that India is the country 
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. He has described this vulnerability in 
terms of four facets: the monsoon, the vulnerability of India’s forest cover to the demands 
for mineral resource extraction, the Himalayan glaciers, and coastal vulnerability to rising 
sea levels.  
In the same speech in which he spoke of the accountability of the climate modellers, 
Ramesh (2010) offered a glimpse of the epistemic underpinnings of this claim. The monsoon 
vulnerability he describes by discussing a correlation between GDP growth rates and 
monsoon variability.8 On forests, he depicts a spatial correlation between forest areas and 
areas of mineral wealth. On glaciers, he notes the dependence of many millions of people 
on the water that springs from the Himalayan range, but, like Raina (2009), he does not 
offer a particular sense of the glaciers’ future under climate change. One Indian NGO 
grouping deems this ambiguity as tantamount to ‘climate denialism’ (CCI Coalition, 2008). 
On coastal vulnerabilities, Ramesh states that ‘if there is one robust scientific conclusion 
that has been reached after 20 years of research on climate change, the one thing on which 
there is no controversy is the rise in mean sea levels’ (cf. O’Reilly, Oreskes and Oppenheimer, 
2012).  
Together, these claims constitute an archetypal collection of government knowledges – 
variously ambiguous and certain international science, the oscillations of the national 
economy as measured by a single metric that seeks to capture all the productive activity 
taking place within a pre-defined national space, and the spatial coincidence of two types of 
resource – mineral and arboricultural, as observable on a map of the country’s resource 
richness. The latter two examples represent the kind of the governmental gaze described by 
James Scott in Seeing Like a State (1998), the homogenizing and ordering eye of political 
power (also Sivaramakrishnan, 1999). The construction, especially by the state, of forest 
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areas in particular as collections of resources for national exploitation rather than spaces of 
human habitation and ecological interdependence is a long-standing object of critique in 
India (Guha, 2006: 90-124). 
This collection of ways of knowing a national space suggests that when climate change and 
its implications come to be known at the national level, the process is much more complex 
than just downscaling the results of global climate projections. Rather, ‘downscaling’ climate 
change means that the idea comes into contact with a number of political and cultural 
norms and ways of knowing that, this episode suggests, will be unique to particular national 
and even sub-national contexts. Climate change predictions are integrated into longer 
stories of national progress, of collective experiences and risks, and different logics of 
relating economy, government, environment, and national space (cf. Jasanoff and Martello, 
2004). 
These logics have informed and reinforced India’s approach to international climate 
negotiations, with the norms of per capita responsibility and the right to development 
informing India’s resistance to binding emissions targets since the inception of the UN 
negotiations (Dasgupta, 2011). However, in the period in which this study is situated, a 
noticeable shift in India’s stance took place. This began in 2007 with Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh announcing that India’s per capita emissions would never exceed those of 
industrialized countries, essentially introducing for the first time the idea of a national 
emissions cap. By the time of COP16 in 2010, Ramesh had introduced the notion of 
‘equitable access to sustainable development’, which can be seen as an attempt to mediate 
between the long-institutionalized concerns for equity and material development and an 
apparent desire to be seen to play a more constructive role in international negotiations 
(Atteridge et al., 2012; Dubash, 2009; Stevenson, 2011). 
Indian negotiators, along with their US counterparts, were at the forefront of moves to 
inculcate a ‘pledge-and-review’ system of emissions cuts, whereby nation-states would 
voluntarily pledge mitigation actions that would then be monitored by international bodies 
(see Hare et al., 2010). These moves led to fierce debates in parliament between the 
minister and those who saw Ramesh as ceding sovereignty to outside actors, or as one 
Member of Parliament put it, ‘gifting away our carbon space’. However, Ramesh countered 
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such concerns by re-affirming his vision of India’s unique vulnerability, and by arguing that 
incidents when Indian science has countered the received wisdom demonstrate that the 
country does not need to be defensive when it comes to the international monitoring of 
domestic mitigation efforts (Prabhu, 2011). 
For some commentators, the policy shift between 2007 and 2010 resulted from a fear of 
isolation on the global stage. At the same time, many domestic actors and campaigners, 
such as those at CSE, criticized Ramesh for what they perceived as an attempt to align 
India’s position with that of the US, and for uncritically embracing neoliberal approaches to 
mitigation such as market mechanisms and transnational carbon abatement (e.g. D’Monte, 
2009). Ramesh’s manoeuvrings were seen as running counter to the demands of poverty 
reduction, livelihood protection, and economic sovereignty, while extending the 
government’s embracing of a neoliberal, globalist discourse and economic paradigm 
(Atteridge et al., 2012). 
Such rifts occurred even within the government’s climate negotiation team, with several 
veteran members only agreeing to go with Ramesh to the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations 
after eleventh-hour efforts at reconciliation. However, Ramesh also at times stressed a need 
to de-link domestic policy actions from the international proceedings, stating for example in 
2010 that: 
Unfortunately, our approach to climate change has been unduly influenced by 
international negotiations. We need to de-link what we do from international 
negotiations. We need to ask ourselves the question ‘what is in our interest?’ and 
mount the appropriate response. (Ramesh, 2010) 
Statements such as these illustrate arguments put forward by Kythreotis (2012) that the re-
assertion of nation state territoriality in the recent evolution of the climate change debate 
challenges the commonly idealized vision of a post-political consensual environment of 
international collectivism (see Swyngedouw, 2010). The concept of territoriality, conceived 
by Kythreotis as the relational effect of uneven economic power and the articulation of 
interests and differences within and between state borders, offers a powerful way of 
understanding the partial fragmentation of the global climate governance regime and the 
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groundswell of support for more ‘bottom-up’ approaches to climate politics (Biermann and 
Pattberg, 2009; Kythreotis, 2012).  
The ‘pledge-and-review’ approach can be read as an attempt to articulate territoriality 
within a policy architecture that has historically been geared towards multilateral 
agreement (cf. Hare et al., 2010). State-based processes of emissions accounting such as the 
INCCA inventory (INCCA, 2010a) produce ‘a peculiar situation whereby a territorial 
substance…which contributes to a change in the operation of natural systems at a post-
territoriality scale, is conceived of, classified, and managed through its association with the 
persistent territorialities of nation-states’ (Whitehead et al., 2007: 205; see also Lövbrand 
and Stripple, 2011). Like INCCA’s (2010b) predictions, this act of measurement and 
classification reconstitutes territory as a form of political order in the face of the 
deterritorializing potential of the carbon dioxide molecule (cf. Agarwal and Narain, 1991). 
Ramesh’s characterization of Indian domestic policy being ‘unduly influenced by 
international negotiations’ restates and responds to criticisms of the government’s 
overriding focus on the UNFCCC process and its eschewing of other ways of knowing and 
acting upon climate change. INCCA has informed the arguments for delinking domestic and 
international policy action. Predictive knowledge of the national territory is seen as offering 
the Indian government the means to pursue mitigation and adaptation policies 
independently of the international scientific and political processes. With the addition of 
renewed knowledge of national emissions, national territory becomes a newly governable 
space in which particular forms of political action can be exercised by a government 
sensitive to criticism that it has ceded nation-state sovereignty over the Indian economy and 
environment. However, the resistances to Ramesh’s efforts to alter the terms of India’s 
engagement with international climate mitigation negotiations, particularly efforts to 
enmesh the state in a new, highly disputed form of neoliberal globalism, are reminders that 
the redefinition of what, as Ramesh put it, is ‘in our interest’, is a contested terrain. 
Territoriality and territory are not pre-given in such debates. Rather, like the nation-state 
itself, they are constituted through networks ‘held together by circulating technologies of 
representation and communication’ (Jasanoff, 2004a: 26; see also Elden, 2007). The 
participation of climate models in these processes marks an important extension and re-
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casting of longer traditions of national knowledge-making (Edney, 1997; Scott, 1998; 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1999).  
Conclusions 
Territory, as a form of social order, is both premised on and generative of certain kinds of 
governmental knowledge-making, particularly the measurement and calculation of space 
and spatial relationships. In the case offered here we can see a re-emergence or perhaps re-
coding of territory as an epistemic object. That re-coding is evident, for example, in new 
temporal coordinates. Specifically, there is an emerging concern with the future of territory, 
in efforts to induce a new anticipative approach to problems of resource management and 
human development, and in order to persuade and convince other political actors of the 
need to transform the state’s engagement with both domestic and international climate 
politics. Territory is mediated through a didactic futurology, by which it comes to figure as 
an object of combined epistemic and normative contestation (cf. Beck et al., 2013: 9-12; 
Hulme, 2010b). 
As I’ve sought to demonstrate, new territorial knowledges have come about amid a set of 
very particular responses to the nature of international science and the changing nature of 
international climate politics. Although many countries across the world are now pursuing 
what we might think of as territorial knowledge of the future (see e.g. Jenkins et al, 2009 for 
the UK; MoST, 2011 for China), in India the form of this emergent knowledge has been 
shaped by the context of a complex and at times antagonistic relationship with the so-called 
‘Western’ science of the IPCC. The controversy over the melting glaciers claim reanimated 
themes of epistemic and political sovereignty which have long informed climate politics in 
India. A persistent pattern of epistemic and normative intermixing situates predictive 
knowledge claims within a framework of scientific accountability and national autonomy, in 
a powerful illustration of how the science and politics of climate change   are mutually 
constituted. This is the quintessential co-productionist understanding of climate change. But 
I have suggested that in this case, the co-production of the epistemic and the normative has 
a particular valence, to the point where a co-productionist understanding of science and 
politics becomes a strategic instrument in the ongoing construction of social order. 
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It is in this sense that we might begin to think about the agonistic co-existence of different 
co-productions, particularly in the different strategies of reproducing the nation-state in the 
putative global space of international climate science and politics. Recalling the incident 
with which I opened the article, the Indian chair of the IPCC rebuffed the Indian 
government’s challenge to IPCC claims by dismissing them as ‘arrogant’ and ‘voodoo 
science’.  In defending the space of global science against governmental attack, Rajendra 
Pachauri sought to discredit the government’s scientific claims by painting them as 
politically-driven and scientifically disreputable. A number of Indian environmental NGOs 
have similarly argued for the subordination of the nation-state to the authority of global 
science, although bodies like CSE have long argued for the strident defense of national 
sovereignty in the international politics of climate change. In his own response to the glacier 
error, Jairam Ramesh sought to re-inscribe the national in the global space of climate 
science and politics by articulating (and practicing) an epistemic sovereignty alongside 
moves to re-order the relationship between national and international climate policy. 
Ramesh’s political ‘internationalism’ (Dubash, 2013) was thus distinct from the kind of 
epistemic globalism (Miller, 2009) mobilised by Pachauri. Ramesh’s efforts to re-inscribe the 
national in international climate politics (through embracing strategic alliances and 
voluntary pledges) did not, however, sit comfortably with the way CSE articulated the 
relationship between knowledge and action, and national and global . These different co-
productions of knowledge and social order co-exist in dynamic and agonistic tension, with 
science playing different roles in each. Disentangling such articulations of space, knowledge 
and power may be aided by renewed empirical and conceptual exchange between STS and 
critical human geography. 
My observations about the re-emergence of territory as a political object in climate debates 
concur with a number of arguments that have been advanced regarding the fragmentation 
of the global climate governance architecture and the seeming re-assertion of nation state 
territoriality and sovereignty in questions about ethics, responsibility and development 
rights (Biermann and Pattberg, 2009; Kythreotis, 2012; Prins et al., 2010). However, the way 
in which the climate becomes a knowable object in national contexts is contingent both on 
transnational knowledge networks, such as the PRECIS system, that challenge assertions of 
scientific autonomy, and on local modes of authorising and acting upon knowledge, or ‘civic 
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epistemologies’ (Jasanoff, 2005a). In turn, the ways in which the climate re-emerges as a 
local object, described in terms of national space, may begin to shape how states conceive 
their very sovereignty and responsibility to their own citizens and to others (Jasanoff and 
Martello, 2004; Beck, 2009).  
It is in this sense that it is vital to further explore the co-production of territory in the 
complex relationship between climate science and politics. Through the study of 
controversy and emergence, insights can be gained into the processes by which the 
epistemic and the normative mutually shape and condition each other in the ongoing 
construction of political order. The idiom of co-production therefore has the potential to 
contribute to the project of historicizing the role of scientific rationalities in the production 
of particular forms of spatial organization, such as territory, and to offer new insights into 
the evolving spatiality of the nation-state in an era of apparent epistemic and political 
globalization. 
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[Endnotes] 
                                                          
1
 On the links between rivers, religious thought and environmental science and politics in India, see Haberman 
(2006) and O’Reilly (2011). 
2
 See also The Guardian’s interview with Pachauri: ‘India “arrogant” to deny global warming link to melting 
glaciers’, 9 November 2009. 
3
 Pachauri’s denigration of the Indian government’s report in this register led Silke Beck (2012) to criticize the 
IPCC leadership’s tendency to position themselves as gatekeepers in the climate debate, dismissing 
uncomfortable questions as politically-motivated attacks, while often failing to engage with the substantive 
issues being raised. Beck argues that this tactic, of dismissing the messenger before engaging with the message, 
is ironically reminiscent of the agonistic tactics which climate sceptics or deniers are accused of using. 
4
 The controversy quickly garnered these labels in media coverage and on blogs written by commentators 
sceptical of the reality or severity of anthropogenic climate change. As Norton (2010) has shown, the 
‘Climategate’ nomenclature emerged through complex iterative processes enabled by new social media, rather 
than being a concerted, strategic discursive act. 
5
 The IPCC has a trust fund to support the participation of scientists from developing countries, but other 
financial and bureaucratic constraints – like visas and working time – still preclude fuller participation, 
alongside broader issues of language barriers and the diverse nature of climate expertise. See Biermann (2001) 
and Ho-Lem et al. (2011). 
6
 How the years 2050 and 2100 came be stabilised as future-visioning horizons at the science-policy interface is 
an interesting empirical question. In regional climate modelling, near-term projections (e.g. for the 2030s) can 
be problematic due to the prevalence of uncertainties relating to the ‘internal variability’ of regional climates. 
See Hawkins and Sutton (2009).   
7
 Mahony and Hulme (2012) argue that the wide application of PRECIS has been achieved by the packaging of 
the model into a ‘black box’, meaning that users are unable to see or change the computer code which 
underlies the model, and thus they are unable to consider the sensitivity of their regional scenarios to the 
unique characteristics of the model. This is a problem which some philosophers of science have called 
‘epistemic opacity’ – raising the question of whether one needs to know what’s going on inside a model in 
order to make sense of what comes out of it (e.g. Humphreys, 2009). 
8
 On the links between the monsoon, an emergent meteorology and colonial political economy in India, see 
Anderson (2005). 
